The past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in regional trade agreements (RTAs), whose only precedent, though on a less dramatic scale, was the proliferation of agreements in the 1970s. Table 1 lists the agreements notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947-94 (see Schiff and Winters, this issue, for a table presenting the member countries in several RTAS). By the time the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in January 1995, almost all GATT members (notable exceptions include Japan and Hong Kong) were signatories to at least one such agreement. These diverse agreements range from customs unions to free trade areas to nonreciprocal preferential agreements and differ substantially in their scope and treatment of issues such as labor and capital mobility, investment, and production sharing. Nonetheless, it is possible to characterize the growth in RTAs over the past decade as taking place in at least three separate, albeit related, dimensions.
RTAs have deepened, as agreements that originally focused on hard trade restrictions, like tariffs and quotas on manufactures and agriculture, have been extended to "soft" restrictions such as health and environmental standards or to other product areas such as services and intellectual property, where trade policy is typically far more complex. Issues such as investment and capital mobility Table 1 . Regional Integration Agreements Notified to GATT and wro and in Force as of January 1995 that are not strictly within trade policy have also been added. The preeminent example of this change is the European Union, whose successive name changes (from the Common Market to the European Community to the European Union) describe its evolution from a customs union to a single market (with free movement of labor, capital, and services and substantial regulatory harmonization) and, eventually, to an economic union with a single currency.
Widening has occurred as countries not previously a member of an RTA joined one or more such agreements. Examples include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAPTA), which essentially involved Mexico's accession to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and the accession of some of the former European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries to the European Union.
Lastly, new RTAs have been launched and dormant ones revived. The most publicized of these RTAs has been Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Other examples include the Central American Common Market (founded in 1960, but effectively dormant until 1993) and the South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (established in 1993 with the aim of forming a common market among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka).
The international trading system has also deepened and widened. GATT discussions extended for the first time into trade in services and intellectual property rights and plans to embrace industries like telecommunications. Again, a name change signaled this deepening, as GATT became the WTO. The widening occurred largely as a consequence of the collapse of the formerly centrally planned economies. All but nine of the 33 agreements notified to GATT since 1990 have been concluded with Central and Eastern European countries (WTO 1995) .
The search for an economic explanation for this proliferation of RTAs begins with several negatives. Although the literature favoring free trade is as strong as ever, with the ability to rigorously model dynamic externalities, adding intellectual respectability to traditional arguments linking trade liberalization and growth (see Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991a , 1991b and Grossman and Helpman 1991 , it would be difficult to believe that the growth in RTAs represents the policy counterpart to the proliferation of academic papers on trade and growth. Nor has the debate as to whether RTAs are theoretically or empirically preferable to an admittedly imperfect global trading system been resolved in such a way as to encourage the spread of RTAs (see for a survey of the literature debating this issue). In fact, the debate remains lively, although lately, with the Uruguay Round concluded, all parties seem to accept RTAs as a useful accompaniment to the WTO. In any case, policymakers and bureaucrats seem to spend a disproportionate amount of time and effort concluding trade agreements compared with the gains or losses that, at least on the face of it, most RTAs can offer. NAFTA, for example, involved relatively small changes in Mexican trade policy and minuscule changes in U.S. policy yet managed to dominate U.S. political debate in late 1993.* The question therefore arises: Is there more to an RTA than meets the eye? Why might a country create or join an RTA? Could the entry of a country into an RTA change the incentives, and hence the behavior, of that country, other countries, or the private sector in ways beyond the actual provisions of the agreement? And insofar as the RTA does alter future incentives and behavior, how does it change the expectations of all parties involved?
Many policymakers and academics seem to believe in a general and illdefined way that RTAs provide more than the traditional gains from trade; hence the term New Regionalism. Summarizing the conclusions reached in a conference on regional integration, de Melo and Panagariya (1993) report that regional integration is increasingly recognized as going beyond trade in goods, services, and factors. Nonetheless, remarkably little work examines rigorously either the theoretical or the quantitative plausibility of these claims. The few papers that, with varying degrees of rigor, take up this question include Ethier (1996a Ethier ( , 1996b , Gould (1992) , Panagariya (1996) , Perroni and Whalley (1994) , and Whalley (1996) .
In this article we attempt to classify and assess the relative plausibility and importance of nontraditional gains from RTAs. After a brief discussion of the traditional costs and benefits of regional agreements, we examine other possible routes whereby RTAs might benefit their members. These include helping with problems of time inconsistency, signaling, insurance, bargaining power, and coordination. In each case, we discuss the necessary conditions for such an explanation to make sense, give one or more stylized examples of specific types of policy where the benefit might be applicable, examine real-world cases where the explanation might be relevant, and discuss the overall plausibility of the argument. We conclude by comparing NAFTA with the Europe Agreements in light of the preceding analysis.
I. THEORETICAL MECHANISMS
This section discusses several possible theoretical mechanisms by which an RTA could have real effects beyond the actual provisions of the agreement. We start with a short review of the traditional gains and losses from RTAs.
Traditional Gains
In one of the classic demonstrations of the theory of the second best, Viner (1950) shows that a move to free trade between two countries that maintain their respective external tariffs toward the rest of the world could leave both countries worse off. If as a consequence of liberalizing trade with only a subset of its trading partners, one country switched from trade with a relatively lower-cost producer to trade with a higher-cost producer, this would potentially decrease welfare for all. This negative effect on world efficiency is given the term "trade diverting." Some observers have argued that enlargement of the European Community has had a trade-diverting effect on agricultural trade (see, for example, Krugman 1991). Southern European countries now buy grain and other products from relatively high-cost European sources rather than from lower-cost providers on the other side of the Atlantic, in Australia, or in Asia. Northern European countries buy Mediterranean products like olive oil or more labor-intensive products from Southern Europe rather than from cheaper sources in Northern Africa. This effect could be even more pronounced in the context of a customs union that requires the equalization of external tariffs. Indeed, in the United Kingdom one of the main arguments used against entry into the European Community was that it would result in price increases for dairy products previously purchased primarily from New Zealand (see Winters 1993 for an evaluation of European Community integration).
Nonetheless, Krugman (1991) argues that most RTAs likely entail relatively low welfare losses resulting from trade diversion because the countries involved are often geographical neighbors and hence already engage in a sizable amount of trade. However, for that very reason, RTAs may result in substantial losses of tariff revenue for the country that is lowering its tariff barriers (as pointed out in Panagariya 1996; see also Bhagwati 1993) . Most often the less-developed, smaller, or economically weaker countries reduce their protectionist structures the most and bear the redistributional cost. If smaller countries bear the distributional cost, why has the number of RTAs increased, especially those involving smaller countries with a larger, more powerful partner? Why do smaller countries make the bulk of the concessions in these agreements? TERMS OF TRADE. In addition to possible distributional effects caused by reducing tariff or quota revenue, RTAs may also cause distributional effects at the expense of third parties. To understand why, note that if an RTA leaves all prices unchanged, with tariffs eliminated on members but maintained on all other countries, then member countries will buy more from one another, each member country will substitute away from consumption of its own goods, and all member countries will substitute away from consumption of goods bought from nonmember countries. Although the net effect on the demand of each member country is ambiguous (because its own demand has fallen, but member demand has risen), if goods are sufficiently strong substitutes, the demand for third-party goods will decrease. In order to clear markets, the price of thirdparty goods will have to fall, which (as long as no member country's price decreases by too much) will create a positive terms-of-trade effect for the member countries. Mundell (1964) makes this point. 2 The potential beggar-thy-neighbor effect can make RTAs an attractive proposition for potential members despite any negative trade-diversion effects for member countries.
INCREASING RETURNS AND INCREASED COMPETITION. A largely unmitigated beneficial effect that may be expected from RTAS stems from the increased size of 2. See Winters and Chang (1996) for an assessment of the terms-of-trade effects from Spain's accession to the European Community. the market, leading to greater productive efficiency for any industry with economies of scale. Indeed, as Krugman (1991: 9) notes, When the European Common Market was formed in 1958, substantial trade diversion seemed a likely outcome. What turned the arrangement into a strong economic success was the huge intraindustry trade in manufactures, and the associated rationalization of production, that the Treaty of Rome made possible.
Note that this factor would make RTAs relatively more attractive for small countries than for large ones, particularly if the country's firms produced solely for the domestic market prior to the RTA. Small countries would also see the traditional benefits associated with increased competition. Thus, one might expect to see them attach a higher priority to joining an RTA.
INVESTMENT. Many analysts cite the need to attract foreign investment and stimulate domestic investment as an impetus for RTAS (see, for example, Balasubramanyam and Greenaway 1993 and Blomstrom and Kokko 1997) . Investment flows between countries have grown dramatically in recent years and are of particular relevance to developing countries, especially as the importance of public sector concessional lending has decreased.
An RTA could stimulate investment flows both between its constituent member countries and from outside the RTA in several ways. By (potentially) reducing the distortions in production within two member countries, an RTA could increase the overall quantity of investment made by investors in those countries. By increasing the size of the potential market, an RTA could increase the quantity of investment made both by domestic and by outside investors. This effect is particularly important for lumpy investments, like a factory, that might only be economic above a certain size. In the case of a customs union, by creating a single market within a common external tariff wall, an RTA may increase the incentive for foreign investors to engage in tariff jumping, that is, invest in a member country in order to trade freely with all other members of the customs union.
It is not the purpose of this article to examine these effects in detail. However, it should be noted that several explanations of nontraditional gains from RTAs are of particular importance in relation to investment. The incentive to invest, for both domestic and foreign investors, depends crucially not only on current trade policies but also on future trade policies, on the nature and level of uncertainty, and on the general macroeconomic and political environment.
We next turn to an examination of nontraditional mechanisms by which a country may gain from an RTA.
Time Inconsistency
An RTA could provide a country with nontraditional benefits if the RTA allows the country to pursue policies that are welfare improving but time inconsistent in the absence of the RTA. A well-known idea in the economic literature, introduced in the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1977) , is that a government that maintains policy discretion will be tempted every so often to surprise the private sector and that this temptation will undermine the credibility of optimal government policies. Hence, adherence to binding rules can restore credibility and lead to superior outcomes.
In the arena of international trade, the problem of time inconsistency occurs if the government faces the temptation to undertake surprise trade policy actions when other first-best instruments are not available. This may lead to governments finding themselves in suboptimal equilibria if they cannot make a credible promise not to intervene. Staiger and Tabellini (1987) examine the credibility issues that arise when, in the presence of a terms-of-trade shock, the government is faced with the temptation to use tariffs to transfer income from workers with high income (and hence relatively lower marginal utility of income) to those with low income (and relatively higher marginal utility). In a model in which the relocation of workers involves a loss in productivity, a terms-of-trade shock will leave wages unequal across sectors. Consequently, the government may be tempted to intervene by using trade policy to reduce the wage differential between sectors. To the extent that workers anticipate the government's intervention, the wage differential that results in equilibrium will be left unchanged. The intervention serves only to decrease the number of workers that exit the injured sector. This occurs because the anticipation of a subsidy to those workers who remain in the injured sector decreases the number of workers who exit, leaving the equilibrium wage plus the subsidy equal to the net return that the marginal worker would receive from exiting the injured sector.
For a large set of parameters, the optimal policy for the government to pursue in the situation described above is free trade. This policy, however, will be time inconsistent if the government cannot commit to it by, for example, setting up in advance credible rules for trade policy. The reason for this is that, while anticipated trade policy does not change the income distribution, unanticipated protection does. Therefore, government has an incentive to surprise the private sector, which, knowing this, no longer finds the ex ante optimal policy of free trade credible. The time-consistent equilibrium is given by a tariff level that is fully anticipated and such that the government no longer has any further incentive (because of large distortions) to surprise. This time-consistent equilibrium is inferior to the free-trade equilibrium, which, in the absence of some binding mechanism, cannot be attained.
This story shows one of many plausible time-inconsistency problems in international trade policy (see Staiger 1995 for a review of this literature). A simpler example is the case of a country whose optimal policy is to open itself up to foreign investment. Once foreign investment has been made, however, the country has the ability to confiscate it (in practice, confiscation might be through the imposition of a greater regulatory or fiscal burden). Suppose that it would be optimal for a sufficiently impatient government to engage in such confiscation. If the country is unable to commit to abstaining from this action, foreign investors, perceiving this time-inconsistency problem, will not invest. The country will be worse off than if foreign investors had invested and the government had not confiscated the investment.
What is the possible contribution of an RTA to solving any set of timeinconsistency problems? To be a valid mechanism for solving a time-inconsistency problem, the RTA must fulfill two conditions. First, policies in the absence of an RTA must be time inconsistent. That is, they must be optimal ex ante, but not ex post, at least with sufficient probability to be a material concern. Second, exit from the RTA must cost enough to outweigh the gains from simply abrogating the agreement and returning to the time-consistent policy. Is there some set of policies for which an RTA could fulfill these conditions? Here we evaluate how an RTA might contribute to solving time-inconsistency problems within the context of two sets of policies: trade and other domestic reforms.
Unilateral liberalization of a country's economy, even for a small economy, is unlikely to be a time-consistent policy. Perhaps more important, it is also unlikely to be a politically popular move with import-competing sectors (see Hillman and Moser 1996 for an analysis of limited trade liberalization based on political concerns and the consequent impetus for cooperative reciprocal liberalization). The government is likely to face large temptations to protect some sectors in the economy for income distributional reasons, for political economy concerns, or for terms-of-trade considerations. Although the government may extend protection and subsidies in only a few sectors at a time, over longer periods of time the economy is likely to become severely distorted.
3 An RTA, by making the cost of even a small deviation from an agreed trade liberalization large (either by forcing the country to exit from the agreement or by having members punish the deviating country), makes it easier to overcome small temptations that culminate in a greatly distorted economy overall.
The question that must be faced here, however, is whether some easily available alternative policy-either through GATT or through some domestic alternative-could enforce a country's commitment to trade liberalization. The domestic alternative is relatively easy to argue against; it is difficult to think of ways that a government can easily and credibly bind itself to not protect a sector. It could be argued, however, that the private sector can punish a government that undertakes gradual forays into protection. This punishment would be part of a trigger strategy, whereby a protectionist act by the government would trigger the expectation on the part of private agents that more protection would be swiftly forthcoming. As a consequence, the private sector would immediately distort its production activities, thereby obtaining the expected protection sooner rather than later. The government, understanding the expectations and actions that would be triggered by a small deviation into protection, would therefore refrain from protection altogether.
The problem with the above argument is not its game-theoretic correctness, but rather the immense amount of expectational coordination required on the part of atomistic agents. Note that it is but one of many equilibria, and although explaining cooperative behavior by trigger strategies is enlightening when applied to repeated interactions among several large agents, the argument is less persuasive in the context of an economy with many small agents. 4 The reason why GATT in some cases will not serve as a commitment device whereas an RTA may is more subtle. The answer, it seems to us, must lie in the differing incentives for countries to punish a deviating member within the two organizations. Within GATT, the responsibility for singling out a culprit and, if the organization delivers a guilty verdict, delivering some retaliatory punishment lies with the country or countries that have been hurt by the action. In a large organization with a more diffuse trade structure, this incentive is likely to be much smaller for any single member, and the process likely to be slower and the outcome more uncertain, than within a regional agreement. In an RTA it is much clearer who has the responsibility to punish, and the reputational loss from not doing so should accordingly be greater.
For example, suppose that, within an RTA such as Mercosur, Argentina does not (credibly) threaten to retaliate when Brazil attempts to protect some industry. The incentive for Brazil to engage in this behavior again, with some other industry in some other instance, will be correspondingly larger. Argentina, therefore, faces a high future cost from not retaliating. Within GATT, the country that offends next time or the set of countries that are hurt could very well be different, and the country responsible for not retaliating or not retaliating at the correct level may be less identifiable, making the cost of not retaliating correspondingly smaller. Thus the extent to which RTAS increase the importance of regional trade and make unambiguous the set of partners responsible for the retaliation contribute to making RTAs a superior enforcement mechanism than GATT.
An alternative way in which an RTA may dominate GATT as a mechanism that can render policies time consistent relies not on an RTA having a superior punishment mechanism than GATT, but instead on an RTA changing incentives in a way that differs from GATT. A prime candidate for this explanation is increased domestic and foreign investment. Most likely, investment would increase for a partner in an RTA more than it would under GATT. This is because, if credibly in place, an RTA gives preferential access to a given set of markets, whereas GATT does not. Furthermore, precisely this preferential access and the additional investment that accompanies it may turn trade liberalization from a unilaterally or multilaterally unattractive proposition for a given country (due to domestic political concerns, for example) into a politically feasible proposition (see Ethier 1996a , 1996b and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1996 . Thus trade reform that is infeasible without an RTA becomes feasible with one. This conclusion is reinforced if the RTA includes aspects of deeper integration, such as harmonization of the investment code, that are harder to negotiate multilaterally, but that can increase the attractiveness of freer trade.
Some analysts believe that the benefits of an RTA go beyond extending credibility solely in the area of trade reform and spill over into other micro-and macroeconomic reforms. Whalley (1996: 16) , for example, asserts that a desire to increase the credibility of domestic reforms was a central preoccupation behind Mexico's negotiating position on NAFTA:
As such, it led to the outcome that Mexican negotiators were less concerned to secure an exchange of concessions between them and their negotiating partners and were more concerned to make unilateral concessions to larger negotiating partners with whom they had little negotiating leverage as part of the bilateral negotiation. The idea was clearly to help lock in domestic policy reform through this process.
An RTA that clearly stipulates domestic reforms and an appropriate punishment incentive will likely serve as a commitment mechanism. However, most RTAs, including NAFTA, do not (although the Europe Agreements do contain elements of commitment to domestic policy reform).
It seems unlikely that RTAs will help provide commitment to policies that are not explicitly part of the agreement unless the agreement itself has changed the underlying incentives. Hence an expectation of a reformed monetary or fiscal policy on the basis of an RTA alone seems mistaken. The extent to which an economy within an RTA is more open than before the agreement may help to discipline macroeconomic policies, although it may just as well provide greater temptations to manipulate exchange rates in the hope of increasing competitiveness, if only momentarily.
For example, the establishment of Mercosur coincided with radical domestic policy reforms, which led some analysts to suggest that Mercosur's member countries are trying to entrench domestic policy discipline, particularly because these countries have a long history of failed attempts at domestic macroeconomic adjustment. But it is not clear whether the Real Plan in Brazil gains or loses in credibility because of Mercosur. On the one hand, the greater openness of the economy may increase the incentive to maintain fiscal discipline because any increase in aggregate demand is likely to leak into imports rather than into the demand for domestic products. On the other hand, Mercosur may make the maintenance of a semifixed exchange rate more difficult because the loss in competitiveness resulting from the combination of a fixed exchange rate and domestic inflation will lead more quickly to a surge in imports and a possible balance of payments crisis.
The experience of the French government in the early 1980s provides an example of an RTA increasing a government's credibility. The French government discovered that it could no longer pursue macroeconomic policies that differed radically from those of the Federal Republic of Germany because domestic fiscal expansion simply leaked into an unsustainable current account deficit. The political result was an impetus toward greater macroeconomic policy coordination, now culminating in the European Monetary Union. Although it might seem relatively easy to argue that an RTA would have difficulty surviving without some degree of fiscal and monetary discipline among the member countries, the history of earlier RTAs among developing countries gives lie to the belief that an RTA will provide sufficient incentive for countries to do so (see, for example, Genberg and de Simone 1993 for an analysis of how import substitution practices and fiscal and monetary policy led to the failure of the Latin American Free Trade Agreement). The difference between the two experiences-the success of the European Union and the failure of some RTAs-may lie with the differential in exit costs, which could very well increase with the longevity of the agreement.
In the discussion so far, the time-inconsistency arguments assume implicitly that the objective function of the country does not change. This assumption does not hold in the more interesting case of political time inconsistency. This case occurs when a country's current government's policies are not time inconsistent, but the current government fears that a subsequent government might not have the same objective function. In this case, the current government could use an RTA to tie the hands of an alternative government in the future.
For example, consider a country with two political parties, liberal and protectionist. When the liberal party governs, it may wish to sign an RTA to prevent the protectionist party from reversing trade liberalization when it comes into power. Thus the policies guaranteed by the RTA could be consistent with the objective function of the government that signs it and inconsistent with that of some future government. Furthermore, the RTA may affect not only the incentives of the protectionist party if it takes power but also the probability of the protectionist party coming into power. If the voters perceive that a protectionist party could implement its policies only at great cost, RTA membership might reduce the probability of electing a protectionist party. By contrast, if free trade is popular, but the government is generally unpopular, the voters might elect the protectionist opposition, knowing that it will not be able to implement protectionist policies in practice.
The potential benefits of RTAs for helping with political time-inconsistency problems rely on similar, although less restrictive, basic conditions as those required for helping with economic time-inconsistency problems. With political time inconsistency, government policy itself need not be time inconsistent for the given objective function. Rather, the policies contained in the RTA must be time inconsistent under some possible future course of events, the RTA must effectively constrain such policies, and the cost of exit must be large.
The political time-inconsistency argument clearly has some relevance in the case of the European Union. Although the European Union is a special case because its coverage is far deeper than that of any other RTA, its recent and likely future widening has some broader relevance. Existing and prospective members have always seen European Union membership as a way of committing themselves to "Europe." By this is meant not only, and not even primarily, trade liberalization within Europe but also membership in the European political system of liberal democracy. This political aspect applied to the initial formation of the European Union, which had the clear political objective of constraining Germany. It also applied to the accession of Greece, Portugal, and Spain (each formerly governed by authoritarian regimes of the right), to the Europe Agreements (designed to lead to eventual accession) with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (formerly governed by authoritarian regimes of the left), and to the conditionality attached to the European Union's recent customs union agreement with Turkey (covering human rights and free speech issues).
A similar political motivation may help to explain the recent spate of Latin American RTAs. Newly democratic countries after many years of authoritarian rule have actively sought to cement a new relationship among governments by entering into trade agreements of various sorts. But besides being a celebratory event, does entering into an RTA increase a country's commitment to democracy? Some agreements, such as Mercosur, have followed the European Union's lead in making democracy a necessary condition for membership. That these clauses are not necessarily vacuous was demonstrated in April 1996 when Mercosur foreign ministers warned a Paraguayan general contemplating a coup that diplomatic and economic isolation would follow (see the Mercosur supplement in The Economist, vol. 341, no. 7987 [October 12, 1996] ). In addition, RTAs may deepen ties and facilitate the exchange of information among democratic neighbors, and they may help to avoid conflicts among traditionally more pugnacious members, such as Chile and Bolivia (see Schiff and Winters 1996 for an analysis of the formation of RTAs as an optimum response to security problems among its members).
Signaling
An alternative potential benefit from RTAs is signaling. For an RTA to work as a signaling mechanism, an RTA does not have to help bind a country to policies that would otherwise be time inconsistent. In this case, the prime motivation for the RTA is not the provisions of the agreement itself, but rather the fact that entering the RTA is only worthwhile under certain circumstances, and the country wants to persuade others that those circumstances do in fact prevail.
For example, consider a country that could have either a liberal or a protectionist government. Suppose that it has a liberal government, but this is not immediately apparent to outside observers, and that potential investors are not particularly interested in the exact provisions of any RTA, but they do care about the type of government. By entering an RTA, the government signals to investors that it is in fact liberal.
Alternatively, the government may wish to signal something about the underlying condition of the economy, such as the prospective competitiveness of its industry or the sustainability of the exchange rate. Suppose, for example, that the country wishes to attract investment to the manufacturing sector, but investors do not know if the sector is likely to be competitive. If entering the RTA is very costly for a country with an uncompetitive manufacturing sector, then the RTA may signal to foreigners that the manufacturing sector is competitive and hence stimulate investment.
Finally, the RTA may signal not the policies of individual governments but their future relationships. This would be relevant if private investors are uncertain about the relationship between two governments or if they fear that trade barriers will be reimposed between the two countries. Investors may only be prepared to invest in one or both countries if both signal their future good relations by signing an RTA. This may be particularly relevant for RTAs between developing countries, which historically have not been very successful and are often motivated by the desire to attract foreign investment.
Two conditions are needed for a signaling explanation to make sense. First, there has to be a significant information asymmetry. That is, the government has to have superior knowledge, either about its own preferred policies or about the economy, than other agents. The information asymmetry condition is most likely to be met in cases where there is a significant degree of doubt about the government's commitment to liberalization or reform. It is thus most likely to be relevant in countries that have previously had relatively protectionist policies or where liberalization attempts have failed in the past, like the Mercosur countries.
Second, unlike the time-inconsistency case, there need not be a large cost of exiting an RTA, but rather there has to be a significant cost to entering the agreement, at least for some hypothetical governments in at least some circumstances. This argument, at least in theory, has some degree of plausibility. In facing down domestic opponents to an RTA, governments may have to invest political capital that may represent a sunk cost. Moreover, joining an RTA typically requires an immense amount of negotiating time and effort, particularly for developing countries that may have only a small amount of the necessary expertise, with competing claims on this resource. For example, it appears that the binding constraint on European Union membership for several Central European countries is currently neither political nor macroeconomic, but the institutional and legal changes needed to bring these countries up to European Union standards. Of course, some bureaucracies may give positive weight to using resources in this fashion, thus invalidating use of this mechanism as a signal in those cases.
Insurance
An RTA can improve the welfare of its members by providing at least one of them with insurance against possible future events. This may help explain why in some agreements, particularly those involving a large and a small country, the smaller country may enter on worse terms.
For example, consider a country that faces macroeconomic uncertainty about the level of its imperfectly flexible real wages. If real wages increase more than anticipated, the country would like to devalue to improve competitiveness and avoid a fall in output and employment. However, if it does so, one or more of its trading partners may impose trade restrictions. The fear of such an eventuality can explain why this country could seek to enter an RTA with that trading partner on relatively unfavorable terms, but with the provision that devaluation would not provoke a protectionist response. The unfavorable terms of the RTA then constitute a type of insurance premium paid by one country to the other. The situation need not be asymmetric; whichever country experiences an adverse shock would be allowed to devalue.
However, most RTAs, including NAFTA, allow the imposition of contingent protection (such as antidumping duties) and make exemptions for national security (which, as the case of the U.S. Helms-Burton Art shows, countries may attempt to interpret broadly). Thus the insurance role of an RTA may be severely limited. Some of these actions, however, can be seen as the outcome of the multisided provision of insurance in which all members, under special circumstances, are allowed to claim protection (which is what these contingent protection clauses allow). Total arbitrariness in claiming the need for this protection would be restricted both by the greater accountability implicit in an agreement with a small number of parties (relative to the WTO) and by the repeated game nature of the accord. Perroni and Whalley (1994) hypothesize that smaller countries might seek to join an RTA as insurance against a generalized (world) trade war in which they would lose the most. In return for this insurance, the small countries offer the larger countries largely nontrade benefits such as greater protection for intellectual property. Alternatively, another inducement to join an RTA could be to obtain insurance against a major trading partner arbitrarily imposing, say, health standards. A country could more easily appeal such standards in the context of an RTA than under GATT. Raff (1996) offers a related interpretation in which the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is insurance against a trade war between the two countries that is generated by multiple equilibria in a bargaining game. In this interpretation, an RTA is a means of binding the parties to a cooperative way of "playing the trade game." Whalley (1996) sees the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement as a way for Canada to obtain arrangements that limit the application of U.S. safeguard measures and, in turn, assure the United States that Canada will not return to policies in energy and investment that were adverse to U.S. interests. Flam (1995) estimates that Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which recently joined the European Union, will benefit very little from liberalized trade with their trading partners. Under the European Economic Area provisions, they already effectively had free trade with the European Union countries. Joining the European Union meant that they had to make significant net transfers to the European Union budget. Again, an insurance argument might explain the decision of these countries to join the European Union.
The insurance explanation may help to explain, in pan, the flourishing of RTAs now and in the 1970s. If some group of countries, say the European Union, has independent reasons (for example, decreasing the likelihood of another European war) for forming an agreement, then the very fact of their doing so may cause a chain reaction. Other countries, fearing more protectionist responses from "fortress Europe" and seeing a reduction in the number of potential alternative trade partners (and hence the gains from diversification), decide to form their own regional block, thus provoking yet more countries to do so. The recent deepening and widening of the European Union, at least in part as a response to political concerns, could have triggered the chain reaction.
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In a less benign view of the chain reaction theory, a period in which low-wage countries increasingly compete for markets in industrial countries presents an opportunity for industrial countries to obtain significant concessions from lowwage countries by playing off their fears of being left out in the cold. A small country might sign an RTA with a large country in an effort to become the large country's favored low-cost supplier with lower protectionist barriers. That small country will become significantly more attractive to investors than the remaining low-cost countries. Thus smaller countries scramble to enter RTAs with larger partners and make significant concessions in order to do so. Bhagwati (1991) , for example, cites then-President of Mexico Salinas as stating that a factor pushing Mexico toward an RTA was the fear that European investment would be diverted to Eastern Europe once it integrated with the European Community. As Salinas put it at an early stage of the NAFTA negotiating process (as cited in Perroni and Whalley 1994: 4 , from The Globe and Mail, April 10, 1990, p. Bl), What we want is closer commercial ties with Canada and the United States, especially in a world in which big regional markets are being created. We don't want to be left out of any of those regional markets.
The insurance explanation is less convincing in the context of agreements between developing countries. For example, in the event of a global trade war or of a resurgence of protectionism in the major export markets of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) or Mercosur, all of the member countries would suffer, as they would to a lesser extent from any major macroeconomic shock. Thus small countries are not particularly logical candidates to insure one another, and the chain reaction theory does not explain why these countries would enter into agreements with one another.
Bargaining Power
Countries may wish to join an RTA to increase their bargaining power with respect to third parties. This makes sense if the countries would in fact have greater bargaining power combined than separately and if the RTA would reduce the transaction costs involved in reaching an optimal negotiating position. This explanation is more convincing for a customs union, which has a common external tariff, than for a free trade area, which does not. For example, the countries of Mercosur have a large incentive to coordinate because a large fraction of 5. Ethier (1996a Ethier ( , 1996b attempts to endogenize regional responses.
Mercosur's trade is still extra-rather than intraregional. The member countries could obtain significant gains from coordinating their trade policies with respect to third countries.
A related but logically distinct position is that in order to spur the slow pace of negotiations in GATT, countries such as the United States played the regional card. This explanation implies that as multilateral negotiations pick up steam, the importance of regional agreements should abate, which, to date, they show no sign of doing. Furthermore, agreements entered into solely by relatively small countries are unlikely to pressure the pace or direction of multilateral negotiations. Multilateral negotiations in the WTO are driven almost entirely by the "Quad" group (Canada, Japan, the European Union, and the United States); developing countries only tend to have influence when they speak collectively on a global basis, led by larger countries such as India.
Countries may also seek to join an existing RTA to enhance their bargaining power with its current members. The most obvious example of this is the progressive movement of most of the former European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries into the European Union. Although the European Economic Area Agreement effectively instituted free trade between EFTA and the European Union, it also obliged the EFTA countries to accept existing European Union standards and case law. Seeing that they were receiving most of the benefits and paying most of the costs of the European Union, but with no say in how those benefits and costs were determined or distributed, most of the EFTA countries quickly opted for full membership. These countries became net contributors to the European Union budget and were obliged to harmonize their agricultural policies with the Common Agricultural Policy. In return, they gained voting rights in future European Union decisions. Of course, the strength of the relative bargaining positions meant that the EFTA countries had to join largely on the European Union's terms, but they evidently believe that the long-term gains will outweigh any costs.
Coordination Device
Finally, an additional political economy explanation for free trade agreements in general is that they serve as a coordination device for those who stand to gain from trade liberalization. It is often argued that the gains from liberalization are widely distributed, uncertain, difficult to quantify, and perhaps longer term, while losses are immediate and visible and fall on specific and identifiable sectors. These factors make coordination much more difficult for those favoring free trade than for those opposing it. A proposed RTA can therefore serve as a political focal point for the forces in favor of free trade.
Why would an RTA serve as the coordination device rather than multilateral agreements such as GATT? Part of the problem in mobilizing forces in favor of free trade is the uncertainty as to who will gain from liberalizing. This uncertainty may be significantly reduced in a regional rather than a global context. The only problem with this argument is that the losers also would be easier to identify. Nonetheless, the reduction of uncertainty could make risk-averse indi-viduals more favorable to an RTA than a multilateral venture. Furthermore, RTAs have very clear internal reciprocity, making it easier for a country to ensure that a concession on its part will elicit a counterpart from another country, benefiting itself.
A different way for an RTA to serve as a coordination device is by allowing tradeoffs between different policy areas. For example, the United States may fear that free trade with Mexico will place downward pressure on U.S. environmental and labor standards. This in turn could lead to political pressure in the United States to reintroduce protection against Mexican exports. Both sides might therefore benefit if the United States commits to continuing its relatively open trade policy with Mexico, while Mexico commits to improving labor and environmental standards. NAFTA can be seen as providing a mechanism for both sides to do so. Furthermore, it is far more difficult to pursue such initiatives in a global context, because it is necessary to deal with multiple issues as well as numerous countries, which may have widely varying standards. This is illustrated by the current lack of success on the part of those countries-notably France and the United States-that are trying to put labor standards on the WTO agenda.
II. COMPARISON OF NAFTA AND THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS
Section I discussed the theoretical mechanisms that might affect a country's incentive to join an RTA and the plausibility of the conditions necessary for these mechanisms to apply. This section examines two recent RTAs: NAFTA and the Europe Agreements.
NAFTA
NAFTA is an example of particular interest in light of the preceding discussion. Several factors suggest that nontraditional gains played a significant role in the creation of NAFTA.
NAFTA involved a relatively low degree of liberalization because trade flows between Canada, Mexico, and the United States were already relatively free. In particular, the extent of U.S. trade liberalization was very small; Mexico made the significant concessions (see, for example, Hufbauer 1992). As a consequence, NAFTA is estimated to have had tiny direct macroeconomic effects on the United States, on the order of a few tenths of 1 percent of gross domestic product over a decade and a few tens of thousands of jobs, less than the margin of error in the quarterly national accounts statistics (see, for example, National Commission on Employment Policy 1992). Even so, NAFTA aroused strong political opposition in the United States, while it was relatively popular in Mexico. Mexican policymakers regarded NAFTA as by far the most important economic priority. In Canada, it was largely a nonissue because the principal political battle over trade liberalization had been fought over the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
Some analysts have argued that economic time-consistency and insurance mechanisms explain Mexico's desire to join NAFTA, despite the small direct gains found by most estimates (Whalley 1996) . However, it is not clear what types of domestic policy reform were involved. NAFTA does not cover macroeconomic policy at all, so it is difficult to see how it could have operated as a commitment device. If it was intended as such, it does not appear to have been effective in this instance because NAFTA did not ultimately make Mexican fiscal and monetary policy more credible, as the 1994 devaluation demonstrated.
Nor did NAFTA cover domestic microeconomic reforms such as privatization or deregulation. Indeed, Mexico has made relatively little progress in these areas since NAFTA, recently backtracking on its commitment to privatize the state petroleum monopoly. NAFTA does commit Mexico to some fairly modest provisions with respect to existing labor and environmental law. However, these provisions were inserted at the request of the United States and were the least attractive part of the package from the Mexican point of view.
The political time-consistency argument has also been advanced as an impetus behind NAFTA. For example, Gould (1992) argues that NAFTA will "weaken domestic political pressures from special interest groups to reverse trade liberalization." But domestic political pressures to reverse reform in Mexico never focused primarily on trade in any case; policies such as privatization and labor law reform, not covered by NAFTA, were and are far more controversial. However, after the recent peso crisis, Mexican tariffs on countries outside NAFTA increased sharply. It could be argued that, had the agreement not been in place, the tariff increase would have been across-the-board (although that would also have permitted the increase to be smaller). Overall, therefore, the timeconsistency argument probably has some validity, although it may have been more of an unforeseen consequence than an intended effect. It is perhaps more plausible to argue that Mexican policymakers tried to signal, to U.S. and other foreign investors, that domestic policy reforms were likely to continue and that Mexico's private sector was in good health.
The insurance explanation appears to fit Mexico's accession to NAFTA reasonably well. Mexico joined NAFTA on rather unfavorable terms, securing very little in concrete tariff reductions or other concessions from the United States. Although this was not perceived as an insurance premium by U.S. policymakers, Mexican policymakers may have perceived it as such. Again, this is particularly relevant in the context of foreign investment. To persuade U.S. investors to take advantage of Mexico's low labor costs by investing in Mexico, it was necessary to reassure them not only that tariffs for Mexican exports to the United States were low but also that they would stay low and that contingent protection would be less likely to be imposed.
Macroeconomic developments did indeed lead to a post-NAFTA devaluation of the Mexican peso, which in turn resulted in a dramatic expansion of Mexican exports to the United States, mitigating the recessionary effects of the downturn in Mexican domestic demand. So the insurance-if insurance it was-paid out. Of course, no one knows how the United States would have responded to this expansion in the absence of NAFTA. But it must be at least plausible that there would have been greater pressure for a protectionist response. Indeed, it is arguable that without NAFTA, the United States would not have provided the financial support that enabled Mexico to avert default in early 1995 and perhaps a much worse economic downturn. In this case, NAFTA clearly yielded very large insurance benefits to Mexico (without any ultimate net cost to the United States, yet).
However, it may be stretching the point to argue that this particular insurance mechanism was planned. There is no evidence that Mexican policymakers attached any significant probability to the devaluation of December 1994; instead, they were worried about potential protectionism in the United States or perhaps third countries (as argued in Whalley 1996) . Such protection has not in fact materialized, despite the huge swing in the trade balance in Mexico's favor that has resulted from the Mexican recession and devaluation. Mexico may simply have been "lucky" enough to find itself in the position of the homeowner who gets earthquake insurance thrown in with the normal fire and flood coverage.
Nontraditional gains also played an important role from the point of view of the United States. NAFTA was designed to serve several purposes beyond direct trade benefits. It served as a political reward for, and an investment in the longterm economic stability of, a friendly regime that was perceived to be supportive of U.S. interests. NAFTA, it was hoped, would reduce the pressures of illegal immigration as Mexico's relatively free access to U.S. markets would increase investment and employment in Mexico and hence improve the Mexican labor market. And NAFTA might potentially improve the U.S. bargaining position with respect to the European Union and Japan in multilateral trade negotiations. Although Mexico's share of world trade is small, it represents a significant share of U.S. external trade, and NAFTA may at least have signaled that the United States could attempt to substitute the trading partners of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development with countries elsewhere, especially in Latin America.
However, U.S. opponents of NAFTA saw primarily the traditional losses from free trade; that is, the downward pressure on the wages of relatively low-skilled workers in the United States, and reduced investment in labor-intensive industries.
The Europe Agreements
The Europe Agreements between the Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) and the European Union were concluded in 1993. They are similar to NAFTA in several respects: they are between much larger industrial economies and much smaller emerging economies, they contain significantly fewer concessions by the large countries to smaller countries than vice versa (Perroni and Whalley 1994) , and the trade liberalization provisions have had relatively small direct effects.
As with NAFTA, the pure trade liberalization provisions of the Europe Agreements were not likely to have a substantial effect on trade between Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union. Although Wang and Winters (1991) and Hamilton and Winters (1992) find much smaller exports from Central and Eastern Europe to the European Union-by a factor of 2 to 10-than expected on macroeconomic and geographic grounds, trade barriers were not the primary cause. Using 1989 data, Aghion and others (1992) estimated that removing trade barriers completely would potentially expand Central and Eastern European exports to the European Union by about 40 percent, more than half of which was in agriculture, while other estimates were even lower. However, between 1989 and 1992, without complete liberalization, trade expanded more than 50 percent, mostly in sectors like manufactures, where tariff barriers were not that high (Portes 1993) . This suggests that European Community trade policy was not the primary factor behind the observed expansion in trade. This does not in itself logically imply that European Community trade policy could not affect the volume of trade, but it does suggest that other factors are probably more important.
The Europe Agreements differ from NAFTA in some important ways, however. Unlike NAFTA and most other RTAS-and unlike other agreements between the European Union and less developed or emerging economies-the Europe Agreements contain major provisions that bind the domestic economic policies of the Central and Eastern European countries. The agreements effectively require the application of European Union competition policy law to trade between the European Union and the Central and Eastern European countries; questionable practices are to be judged by reference to European Union law. Given the shaky legal structures of the Central and Eastern European countries and the importance of their trade with the European Union, this amounts to nearly wholesale extension of European Union competition policy to the Central and Eastern European countries. Because member states retain jurisdiction over competition policy if only the domestic market is affected, the Central and Eastern European countries will do so as well.
One area where this extension is particularly important is that of state aidgovernment subsidies or tax breaks targeted to particular industries. The European Commission has been taking an increasingly aggressive line against state aid within the European Union. Many likely recipients of state aid in the Central and Eastern European countries will be potential exporters to the European Union, and this policy could-after an initial transition period-be exported to the Central and Eastern European countries. The policy could help the Central and Eastern European countries avoid a downward auction of tax breaks and subsidies designed to compete for foreign investment. The Europe Agreements therefore could act as a binding mechanism for the Central and Eastern European countries to commit not to engage in such an auction in a way that agreements among just the Central and Eastern European countries would not, because the cost of exit would be much lower.
The Europe Agreements also had a much stronger political element than NAFTA. Both the European Union and the Central and Eastern European countries wanted to lock in a political commitment to democracy in the Central and Eastern European countries. The promise of eventual European Union membership implied in the agreements (although it was not set out in them, it was endorsed by the 1993 Copenhagen Summit) was conditional on the continued democratization of the Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore, a reversion to authoritarianism would cost the countries not just the loss of the benefits, if any, of the agreements but also the loss of the prospect of eventual membership in the European Union. On both political and economic grounds, the time-consistency argument therefore appears much stronger for the Europe Agreements than for NAFTA.
By contrast, the insurance argument appears less persuasive. Perroni and Whalley (1994) argue that the agreements represent a purchase of insurance on the part of the Central and Eastern European countries against a global trade war. However, in light of the text of the agreements, this does not seem persuasive. In the areas where the chances that an increase in European Union protectionism-whether for internal reasons or because of a global trade war-could genuinely damage the economies of the Central and Eastern European countries-most importantly agriculture and one or two other sensitive sectors like steel-the European Union has written in effective "get-out" clauses that enable it to reimpose protection under special circumstances (Portes 1993 ).
III. CONCLUSIONS
RTAs differ hugely in their scope, coverage, and motivation, and there may very well not be any one-size-fits-all explanation of their recent proliferation. However, some common themes do emerge. In particular, the increasing importance of international investment flows of private sector capital, both for industrial and, especially, for developing countries, has heightened the need for countries not just to put the right policies into place but also to provide certainty and credibility as to the direction of future policies and the economic environment more generally. It is no coincidence that this is the common thread running through the various theoretical mechanisms described in this article; commitment, signaling, and insurance mechanisms all have the practical effect of reducing uncertainty or increasing credibility, whether about future national or international economic policies and events or about political developments.
RTAs can therefore serve a useful economic purpose above and beyond the direct gains from trade liberalization by reducing such uncertainties and enhancing credibility. Such credibility would apply to a stable legal environment in Poland, continued access to U.S. markets for Mexican products, or a local market of sufficient size for a new plant in Uruguay. Increased credibility makes it easier for the private sector to plan and invest. Indeed, in some cases the reduc-tion in uncertainty resulting from an RTA may even be a necessary precondition to realizing gains from liberalization.
Nevertheless, before drawing further conclusions about the qualitative and quantitative relevance of these nontraditional benefits from RTAs, analysts should examine closely the provisions of each RTA. What is its scope and coverage? What, if any, is the enforcement mechanism? How and in what circumstances can it be amended? How might it have changed the behavioral incentives of different agents in the economy? These questions are particularly important for assessing the effect of the RTA not directly on trade provisions, but indirectly on incentives, expectations, and future policies.
This article concludes with a word of caution. Even if RTAs do provide nontraditional benefits, such benefits are not necessarily a good thing. Many persuasive voices have argued the possible costs that a proliferation of RTAs may entail (for example , Bagwell and Staiger 1996 analyze the positive and negative effects of regional agreements). Nonetheless, independent of their benefits or detriments from a world welfare point of view, it is important to understand what benefits or costs they provide to their own members and the sources of their apparently increased attractiveness.
